Introduction

In its 2026 annual threat assessment, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Director General Mike Burgess revealed that Australia has foiled 31 major terrorism plots since 2014. He added that 14 “significant terror-related cases” have been resolved since the Bondi terror attack in December 2025.

One of the world’s best security services ASIO uncovered that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) recruited an Australian-Iraqi Kadhim Malik Hamad Rabah al-Hajami also known as Kazam Hamad, a cigarette, tobacco and drug smuggler to mount attacks against a Jewish restaurant in Sydney and a synagogue in Melbourne. The attack in Australia is one of the significant cases of the Iranian regime mounting terrorist attacks exploiting criminals. In response, Canberra expelled its Iranian ambassador. It is a modus operandi of IRGC that will persist in the coming months and years.

By name Kazam Hamad was not identified by ASIO but his profile has been provided by the Iraqi government that detained him in January 2026. The National Center for International Judicial Cooperation in Iraq announced the arrest of a drug trafficker and other criminals wanted by Iraqi and international courts, in response to an official request from Australia. In a statement, the Iraqi government stated, “The accused individual, Kadhim Malik Hamad Rabah al-Hajami, was arrested in coordination with the General Directorate of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Affairs at the Ministry of Interior, after obtaining the necessary approvals from the Supreme Judicial Council to conduct investigations against him. The proceedings were initiated by the First Karkh Investigation Court, which specializes in drug cases.”

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) recruited an Australian-Iraqi Kadhim Malik Hamad Rabah al-Hajami also known as Kazam Hamad, a cigarette, tobacco and drug smuggler to mount attacks against a Jewish restaurant in Sydney and a synagogue in Melbourne

• Name: Kadhim Malik Hamad Riyah Al-Hajali


• Alias (Kunya): Abu Samer


• Nationality: Iraqi + Australian


• Date and Place of Birth: 26 March 1984, Nasiriyah


• Case Number: No. 2564


• Requesting Country: Australia


• Offense Type: Drug-related offenses (Article 28 / Narcotics)


• Legal Status: Arrested


• Date of Arrest and Place of Detention: 21 January 2026


• Arresting Authority: Narcotics Directorate – Al-Karkh (Police)

Describing  Kazam as “one of the most dangerous wanted men in the world”, the Iraqi authorities said, he “is responsible for importing large quantities of drugs into Iraq and Australia, as well as smuggling heroin. He is also involved with the most prominent organized crime gangs in Australia – Sydney, responsible for shootings, murders, kidnappings, violent assaults, extortion, and drug imports. Furthermore, he is involved with outlaw gangs that have extensive influence within Australia and the Middle East and are responsible for carrying out murders, shootings, money laundering, fraud, assaults, arson, and drug trafficking on a global level.”

The Context

The firebombing of the Adass Israel synagogue in Melbourne and an arson attack on a Jewish business in Sydney’s east, the Lewis Continental Kitchen by IRGC followed by the Bondi massacre by the Islamic State is a turning point in Australia’s fight against terrorism.

In response to the sustained terrorism threat facing Australia, Canberra is discussing how to build a capability to address both state and non state terrorist threats. In addition to the threat posed by a hostile state like Iran, exclusivism and extremism and their manifestations terrorism and violence present an enduring threat. The swirl of interconnected threats demonstrates the complexity of the changing threat landscape and the need to address them.

“The firebombing of a synagogue can simultaneously be criminal arson, foreign interference, the promotion of communal violence and politically motivated violence, Mr Burgess said, and when Iran directs the arson, it’s an act of state-sponsored terrorism.”

Background

The terrorist threat to Australia is reflected in a dozen attacks. The most significant attacks since 2014 includes:

• Bondi Beach Shooting (2025): On December 14, 2025, an Islamic State-inspired and antisemitic attack occurred at a “Chanukah by the Sea” community celebration on Bondi Beach in Sydney. Two gunmen opened fire and used explosives, killing 15 people and injuring over 40 others.


• Adass Israel Synagogue Firebombing (2024): On December 6, 2024, masked attackers broke into the Adass Israel Synagogue in the Melbourne suburb of Ripponlea, deliberately pouring an accelerant and setting it ablaze. The attack was later classified as an act of terrorism with links to Iranian state actors.


• Wakeley Church Stabbing (2024): On April 15, 2024, a 16-year-old inspired by Islamism attacked a bishop and parishioners with a knife at Christ The Good Shepherd Church in Wakeley, Sydney, permanently blinding the bishop in one eye.


• Melbourne Stabbing Attack (2018): On November 9, 2018, an Islamic State-inspired attacker set a pickup truck on fire and stabbed three pedestrians in Bourke Street, Melbourne, killing one before being shot and killed by police.


• Brighton Siege (2017): On June 5, 2017, a gunman linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIS stormed an apartment complex in Brighton, Melbourne, killing a man, holding a woman hostage, and shooting three police officers before being killed by authorities.


• Lindt Cafe Siege (2014): On December 15–16, 2014, a lone gunman with a history of radicalization and extremist views held 18 people hostage inside the Lindt Chocolate Cafe in Sydney’s Martin Place. The 16-hour siege ended when police stormed the building, resulting in the deaths of two hostages and the perpetrator.


• Parramatta Shooting (2015): On October 2, 2015, a 15-year-old radicalized youth shot and killed a civilian police accountant outside the police headquarters in Parramatta, Sydney, before being killed in an exchange of gunfire with police.


• Endeavour Hills Stabbing (2014): On September 23, 2014, an 18-year-old radicalized male stabbed two police officers outside the Endeavour Hills police station in Melbourne before being fatally shot.

The Current and Emerging Threat

Australia faces multiple threats from foreign interference and espionage from China to terrorism from Iran, and cyber threats from a range of actors. Delineating the complexity of the threats and challenges ASIO was facing, Mr Burgess said, “A security service cannot simplistically pivot from single threat to single threat; it must counter multiple threats simultaneously”. Reflecting on managing these threats, he added, “Resourcing decisions are not based on a mathematical formula or arcane budget rules; they are continually responding to a dynamic security environment.”

“Even when surging espionage and foreign interference demanded more attention, countering terrorism remained a priority, as I stated publicly in ASIO’s 2022 Annual Threat Assessment,” he said.

“We increased [counter-terror] resourcing when we raised the threat level in 2024, and it continued to grow in the months before Bondi. Resourcing followed the threat.”

“The number of ASIO officers working on our counter-terrorism mission in 2025 was almost double the number from 2005. Almost double.”

The Text of the full speech by Mike Burgess, AM, Director-General’s Annual Threat Assessment 2026

24 June 2026

Good evening, everyone.

I want to begin by acknowledging the pain and grief of the families, friends and community of those killed and injured in the Bondi terror attack.

The Royal Commission and court case constrain what I can say, but I want to put this attack into context.

The context of a deteriorating global and domestic security environment, where a small group of extremists moving to violence with little to no warning is shocking, but sadly not surprising.

Security Environment

In last year’s Threat Assessment, we declassified part of ASIO’s outlook to 2030. I warned we were entering a period of strategic surprise and security fragility, and predicted the threat environment would become more dynamic, diverse and degraded by the end of the decade.

Unfortunately, we are already there.

Dynamic

Dynamic because great power competition is having an ongoing and profound impact on global stability and strategy. Alliances and norms once considered unbreakable are being questioned. Many of the things we’ve taken for granted are being tested: social cohesion, economic stability, supply chain certainty amongst them.

Global tensions, conflicts and advances in technology continue.

All these factors have direct connections to Australia’s security environment.

Diverse

Diverse because instead of discrete risks, we face multifaceted instability where state sponsored aggression and domestic volatility intersect.

At the centre of this convergence are the acute and persistent pressures of espionage, foreign interference, and politically motivated violence. However, the perimeter is expanding.

We are already seeing surges of communal violence and preparation for sabotage. This diversity represents a systematic challenge to national security.

Antisemitism is a case in point.

Antisemitism is often seen through a narrow lens, when in reality it can originate from diverse sources simultaneously, challenging traditional definitions, assumptions, and approaches.

Sadly, and illogically, hatred of Jews is one thing virtually all the violent extremist cohorts have in common.

Neo-Nazis are antisemitic.

Islamic extremism is antisemitic.

Issue-motivated extremists can be antisemitic, particularly when they subscribe to conspiracy theories and stereotypes about the Jewish community.

Nation states can be antisemitic, as we saw with the arson attacks against the Jewish communities in Melbourne and Sydney perpetrated by criminals directed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Anarchists and revolutionary groups can be antisemitic.

This gets surprisingly little media coverage, but Australian companies with perceived links to Israel are being subjected to repeated acts of vandalism and arson by far-left activists.

I recognise criticism of the government of Israel is not of itself antisemitic, but some of the threatening statements made by the perpetrators go well beyond political protest or commentary.

All these groups have very different ideologies. They do not associate with each other – indeed, for the most part, they despise each other. The way they operate, their tactics and techniques are all different.

And yet they are united by a common hatred. Thank you.

My point is that violent antisemitism is not a single, or simple, intelligence problem.

ASIO must identify and address the threat from all these diverse directions. The skills we need to bring to bear and the way we develop and exploit different intelligence feeds, must outdo the dynamics and diverse problems we face.

The firebombing of a synagogue can simultaneously be criminal arson, foreign interference, the promotion of communal violence and politically motivated violence.

And when Iran directs the arson, it’s an act of state-sponsored terrorism.

Our investigation of these arson attacks – one of the most difficult and detailed in recent ASIO history – was led by a counter-intelligence team with support from their counter-terrorism counterparts.

It’s now common for lead information to be first investigated by counter-terrorism officers but shift to counter-intelligence officers and vice versa, which gives you a sense of the diversity and how traditional definitions and distinctions are breaking down.

Degraded

Finally, our security environment has degraded.

Great power competition is driving an insatiable appetite for strategic advantage. As a result, espionage and foreign interference are at extreme levels, while preparation for sabotage is growing in scale and sophistication.

At the same time, politically motivated violence – which incorporates terrorism – remains an acute concern.

Tonight, I want to explain the terrorism threat in some detail – because I am gravely concerned by its temperature and trajectory.

Grievance continues, social cohesion is strained and the likelihood of violence has increased.

Conflict in the Middle East contributes to these dynamics, fuelling frustrations and anger. The impacts could become even more profound if there are further economic shocks or shortages.

Social media is amplifying and accelerating grievance narratives, eroding trust in institutions, promoting discord and inflammatory rhetoric, exacerbating polarisation and creating a permissive environment for violence.

Whether online or in the real world, when intolerance is tolerated, when violent language and violent acts are left unchecked, they become normalised, reinforcing the impression they are acceptable and compounding the likelihood of further violence.

At the same time, global terrorism threats are re-emerging. Traditional groups such as Islamic State and al-Qa’ida and their affiliates are growing their capability to conduct and inspire attacks, enabled both by permissive geographic and online spaces.

These groups continue to see Western interests as legitimate targets.

An Iran-aligned group orchestrated a wave of attacks across Europe earlier this year. Most were low capability attacks, involving arson or rudimentary incendiary devices; most targeted Jewish interests; and all were designed to fuel fear as part of Iran’s anti-American, anti-Israel, antisemitic agenda.

Iran continues to view Australia as a legitimate target for covertly directed acts of violence. We assess there is a realistic possibility the group that’s been active in Europe will expand its networks to this part of the world, and could conduct or inspire acts of arson, vandalism or even assassinations on Australian soil.

New terrorism

Australia’s terrorism threat level remains at PROBABLE, but I do not believe the system was designed for a situation like the one we now face. PROBABLE does not tell the full story.

The next level on the scale is EXPECTED, which applies when we have intelligence about a specific attack. We do not.

But we do know the environment is degrading and acts of politically motivated violence are becoming more likely than PROBABLE suggests.

Just as climate change increases the likelihood of extreme weather but does not forecast specific storms, politically motivated violence, including acts of terrorism, is more likely even though we cannot predict a specific attack.

This is where a degrading security environment intersects with a diverse one. In the current climate, it is too simplistic to assume there is a single terrorism threat or a most likely terrorist threat.

In the aftermath of Bondi, there were calls for greater focus on countering Sunni violent extremism.

This made sense when ISIS and al-Qa’ida were the principal security threats, but contemporary terrorism is far more complex. This is borne out by recent events.

The Bondi attack occurred in December. This is now subject to a court case.

In January, a West Australian man allegedly threw a home-made bomb into an indigenous rally. Had the device exploded, it could have led to another mass-casualty event. This time allegedly inspired by a neo-Nazi ideology.

Then in February, Police charged a different West Australian man with allegedly planning yet another mass casualty attack, this one allegedly targeting WA’s Parliament House, police headquarters and mosques. Again, allegedly motivated by an extreme right-wing ideology. ASIO’s covert online operations team played a key role discovering and identifying that individual.

Since then, we have dealt with extremists across the ideological spectrum. Including one who allegedly combined ideological and extreme Christian beliefs, and an individual allegedly inspired by an extreme left-wing ideology.

These cases demonstrate the diversity and complexity of the contemporary terrorism environment. Many of its drivers are relatively new.

Instead of embracing fixed ideologies, radicalised individuals are increasingly embracing mixed ideologies.

Instead of being radicalised by associates in the real world, individuals are often being radicalised by strangers online.

Instead of being radicalised in group settings, individuals are often being radicalised alone.

Instead of being radicalised over months and years, individuals are increasingly being radicalised in weeks.

Instead of being radicalised as adults, individuals are all too often being radicalised as minors.

Instead of gathering in prayer halls or backyards, radicalised individuals are frequently gathering in encrypted chat rooms.

And, instead of spending time and resources planning sophisticated attacks, radicalised individuals are moving to low-capability attacks with little or no warning.

These dynamics make the contemporary terrorism environment different – and in some ways, more difficult – than we saw with al-Qa’ida and ISIL.

ASIO is leaning in to this challenge. We’ve sharpened our responses, adjusted our thresholds for operational activity and are continually evolving our capabilities – so we welcome the government’s recent investment in the ASIO and AFP counter-terrorism online centre.

Working with our law enforcement partners, we have foiled 31 major terrorism plots since 2014.

31 plots foiled; many lives saved.

That is not an accident.

Nor is it a comprehensive measure of our collective success.

The 31 figure refers to major plots. Working with our law enforcement partners, we resolved scores of less advanced – but still potentially deadly – terror-related cases in the same period.

Of course – as I have said many times – ASIO is not all seeing and all knowing. And we do not want to be. We cannot stop every terrorist, just as we cannot catch every spy. But we continue to work around the clock to keep Australians safe.

Concurrent, Cascading, Compounding

Terrorism is not the only threat we face.

Our degrading security environment is characterised by concurrent, cascading, and compounding threats.

We categorise them into ‘threats to life’ and ‘threats to our way of life’. But in this environment, we cannot focus on one category of threat at the expense of the other. Both are important; both need to be countered – countered simultaneously, not sequentially.

To illustrate this point, I recently looked back over the little red book I use to record key decisions, meetings, and conversations.

In one randomly selected week – not an unusually busy or exceptional working week – my notes show we dealt with more than 40 priority counter-terrorism cases.

Working with law-enforcement and intelligence partners, we investigated:

A 20-year-old with a nationalist racist ideology, who had a detailed written plan for attack;

A 17-year-old with a bomb-making instruction manual, searching for places to undertake an act of politically- motivated violence in support of ISIL and;

Sadly, a 15-year-old with a mixed nationalist, racist and Christian violent extremist ideology, who wanted to blow up a school.

That’s a small sample of threat to life cases that crossed my desk.

At the same time, we were countering multiple, major threats to our way of life. Like our counter terrorism investigations, these investigations were so complex they extended beyond the week in question, but I will run through four that featured.

As I do so, I want you to think about whether ASIO could afford to ignore any of these threats – or prioritise one over the others.

First, my officers spent many hours over multiple days engaging with an individual who was being subjected to an unrelenting campaign of intimidation.

For the past 10 years, a foreign regime has been demanding the man return to his place of birth to address unspecified corruption allegations.

The regime’s officials made repeated late night phone calls to his home in Australia, pressing him to travel.

At one point, an official visited Australia under the guise of tourism to escort the individual to the foreign country.

The attempt failed, but the campaign continued.

Relatives living overseas were told to encourage the individual to cooperate, and threatened retribution if he didn’t. When he still refused to travel, the regime made good on its threats. Relatives were detained, interrogated and subjected to travel bans.

After receiving a desperate plea from one of the detained relatives, a family member in Australia tried to sort things out.

The family member flew to the foreign country to meet the regime’s officials. They interrogated the traveller for hours, and bluntly stated the individual would only be allowed to return to Australia after agreeing to maintain phone contact with the regime and file reports on the target of the harassment.

We call a campaign of this type a coerced repatriation, where a foreign government applies unrelenting pressure on someone living in Australia.

The victims almost certainly face some form of punishment, persecution, or prosecution if and when they return to the country where they are wanted.

In many cases, the victim is a critic of a foreign regime, and the coerced repatriation is a blatant attempt to silence them.

Even in other cases where there is an allegation of criminality, coerced repatriations still violate individual human rights and Australian sovereignty, because they bypass established norms and international arrangements governing law enforcement cooperation.

Sometimes the pressure is applied directly by agents of the foreign government. ASIO recently caught two officers trying to coerce their target at a Victorian fast-food restaurant.

Sometimes the pressure is applied indirectly. In these cases, the foreign service employs Australian private investigators, lawyers or other professionals to track down potential victims, monitor their movements and pass on threatening messages.

ASIO is aware of at least five regimes targeting Australians with these tactics.

One country in particular is extremely active.

In 2023 alone, that country coerced at least eight individuals to leave Australia for the place of their birth. Five were Australian citizens or permanent residents. Three never returned.

We fear that is a fraction of the real number, because the victims are usually too scared to report the coercion. Despite repeated complaints to the government and their officials, ASIO keeps discovering and investigating cases.

Even when the pressure is subtle, it is cumulative and the ultimate effects can be brutal. Sustained pressure undermines a person’s agency and independent decision-making, and has a chilling effect on the wider diaspora community.

Coerced repatriations encourage self-censorship, stifle freedom of speech and undermine participation in political discourse.

If you are conducting coerced repatriations in Australia, understand this – ASIO is onto you and we have zero tolerance.

If you are a private investigator or lawyer, and an overseas client wants you to locate and monitor someone in Australia, understand this – ignorance is no excuse.

You could be aiding and abetting foreign interference.

Do your due diligence, ask questions, seek to understand what is really going on.

If you are being pressured to return to your country of birth, understand this – you DO have a choice. Contact Police or the National Security Hotline.

In the example I just shared about the 10-year campaign of coercion, ASIO supported the victim. Fortunately, he still refuses to travel. We raised the case with the regime’s officials and referred it to the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce, which recently commenced operational activity against the perpetrators.

Iran

While some regimes seek to silence Australian citizens by luring them overseas, others are more brazen and perpetrate harm onshore.

At the time, we were working with the coerced repatriation case, another counter-intelligence team achieved a significant breakthrough in its ongoing investigation of Iran’s involvement in the antisemitic arsons.

ASIO identified direct links between Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp – the IRGC – and two individuals who were living offshore but maintained strong ties to Australia. Knowing full well they were being directed by the Iranian regime, these individuals orchestrated two attacks on buildings associated with Jewish Australians, using a complex chain of proxies including Australian-based criminals.

An Iran-based Australian citizen orchestrated the firebombing of the Lewis Continental Kitchen in Bondi, the first major attack in the summer of antisemitism. This person is a senior agent of the IRGC Qods Force, running its networks around the world.

We know more about him than he realises, including the name of his superior in Iran and the department he works for.

Department eleven-thousand, a covert unit within the IRGC Qods Force, is responsible for coordinating operations in the West.

Tonight, I can also confirm that a former Australian resident living in Iraq directed the attack on the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne.

Iran recruited him through a complex web of Iraqi-based militia groups.

Valuing his high wealth and criminal connections, the IRGC protected him and supported his illegal enterprises. That changed dramatically after ASIO publicly named Iran’s involvement in the antisemitic arsons. This person’s Iranian backers lost their enthusiasm, and after further pressure from Australian and local law enforcement, they threw him in prison.

I cannot name the two individuals tonight to protect ongoing investigations and related prosecutions but I want them to understand this: we know who you are, we know what you’ve done and we know who you work for.

Thankfully, no one died as a result of the arson attacks. But I do worry that one day an Australian will be killed at the hands of a foreign government here in Australia. My concern is only heightened by the possibility the Iran-backed group conducting attacks in Europe could expand its operations, including to Australia.

ASIO continues to investigate and act. The conflict in the Middle East and how a regime under pressure may respond, remains a focus.

In March, we conducted numerous warranted activities targeting Australians in direct contact with the IRGC. We assessed these individuals were seeking to covertly promote hatred, foster antisemitism and encourage violence against Iran’s perceived enemies.

We were present in the community, we were active against these individuals, and we actioned and triaged every lead and snippet of information to mitigate this threat.

Critical Infrastructure

The third matter we dealt with can also be a ‘threat to life’ in extreme circumstances.

We discovered nation state hackers had compromised the network of an Australian critical infrastructure provider. ASIO assessed the hackers were preparing for sabotage. They weren’t planting ‘digital dynamite’ as such; they were mapping out the network and maintaining access so they could cripple it at a time of their choosing.

Cyber sabotage is an evolving threat, and I have established dedicated teams to counter it. As ASIO’s understanding grows, so does our level of concern.

The scale of this activity – led by one nation state in particular – is difficult to overstate. You and they would be surprised how extensive our warrant coverage is. We struggle to find a single country in our region that has not been compromised by this state’s cyber apparatus.

Critical infrastructure in the energy and communications sectors, as well as infrastructure supporting the military, are top targets.

In this case, a state-sponsored group didn’t just achieve access to the Australian critical infrastructure provider, it successfully acquired credentials – log in details and passwords – for active users of the networks, including the IT professionals guarding it.

ASIO identified, tracked and attributed the hack, and worked with the victim company and our security partners to remediate the compromise – work which is ongoing.

AUKUS

Finally that week, it should surprise no one in this room that Australia’s defence capabilities and AUKUS remain priority targets for foreign intelligence services. For some nations, even ones we consider friendly, AUKUS is their top priority target.

A spy from a foreign intelligence service approached an Australian security clearance holder online, pretending to be from a consulting company.

The spy paid the official to write two reports on Australia’s relationship with our Pacific neighbours, and then, thinking he’d been hooked, offered money for inside information on AUKUS. The foreign intelligence service wanted insights on the progress of Pillar 1, the technologies of Pillar 2, the amount of money being invested, Australia’s geo-strategic ambitions, relations between the three AUKUS governments and the likely trajectory of Australian public opinion.

I’m pleased to report the clearance holder became suspicious reported the contact.

When my officers interviewed the clearance holder, they gained valuable insights into the foreign service’s information gaps and tradecraft. The person even handed over the money he’d received from the spies for writing the earlier reports. In effect, ASIO disrupted the foreign intelligence service’s operation and made them pay for it.

But, we didn’t stop there.

My officers borrowed the phone from the official and rang the so-called consultant in her home country. Thinking it was her target, the spy picked up and got a very unwelcome surprise when she realised she was speaking to ASIO.

We demonstrated we knew exactly who she was, demanded she cease targeting Australian citizens, stated we have zero tolerance for spying on AUKUS, provided a quick overview of Australia’s espionage laws and pointed out the Director-General reserves the right to speak publicly about these matters. At that point the spy hung up.

Message received.

To close off this matter, and in case she did not report our interaction, my officers raised this matter directly with the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS).

And in case they did not report it up – I’m confirming it now.

Using professional networking sites to recruit Australians is a low cost and low-risk vector for foreign intelligence services. They are also using less scaled but more sophisticated techniques to target AUKUS and its associated capabilities, and we expect it will only increase as the project matures and the attack surface expands.

Defending Defence and its capabilities from espionage and foreign interference will always be a priority for ASIO. Australia’s war fighters rely on it. Our strategic advantage depends on it. Our partners’ expectations require it.

Conclusion

Coerced repatriation, state-based terrorism, preparation for sabotage, and seeking insights into AUKUS, are the four threats that overlapped in that typical week.

But there were many other operations I cannot talk about in this forum – including attempts to manipulate our democracy and undermine our economy – as well as the details of 40 priority counter-terrorism investigations.

It might sound like ‘one of those weeks’ but at ASIO every week is one of those weeks.

Each of the four matters I described represented a significant threat and a significant challenge. In every case, we were countering a sophisticated, capable and highly resourced nation state.

But the biggest challenge is the cumulative one: in a degraded security environment defined by concurrent, cascading, compounding threats, when resources are limited, how and what do you prioritise?

What’s more important: the liberty and agency of an individual, countering antisemitism, the availability of critical infrastructure or defending AUKUS?

I don’t believe we can prioritise the major threats – you must deal with all of them.

This is why I say we face an unprecedented number of threats, with an unprecedented cumulative level of harm.

We do not have the luxury of sitting back and admiring threats, we must confront them. Our attention and our resources must go where the threat takes us.

This is important because it is often misunderstood.

A security service cannot simplistically pivot from single threat to single threat, it must counter multiple threats simultaneously. Resourcing decisions are not based on a mathematical formula or arcane budget rules, they are continually responding to a dynamic security environment.

If we know about a serious threat, we address it. And if we have concerns about a developing threat, we inquire and investigate.

In both cases, we are enabled and constrained by the law.

ASIO’s actions must always be proportionate to the threat we face.

ASIO lowered the terrorism threat level in 2022 because there were fewer extremists with the capability and intent to conduct attacks.

Even when surging espionage and foreign interference demanded more attention, countering terrorism remained a priority – as I stated publicly in ASIO’s 2022 Annual Threat Assessment.

We increased CT resourcing when we raised the threat level in 2024 and it continued to grow in the months before Bondi. Resourcing followed the threat.

The number of ASIO officers working on our counter-terrorism mission in 2025 was almost double the number in 2005. Almost double.

That reflects a bigger ASIO but also an on-going commitment to leave no known serious threat untreated.

Staffing does not tell the whole story.

Twice as many staff does not necessarily mean twice as much intelligence or twice as many investigations, and definitely not twice as many disruptions.

In the new terrorism environment I’ve outlined tonight, even a vast army of ASIO case officers and surveillance officers may not be sufficient to find an individual who’s been radicalised online and uses encrypted communications. The unfortunate reality is the terror alert system will never include a level of “impossible” or “unthinkable”. Which is why I say we will always address known serious threats, and why we must continually evolve and improve our capabilities.

Now I appreciate this Annual Threat Assessment is not exactly upbeat, bedtime reading. As always, I’ve chosen to be frank about our security environment and our circumstances because we cannot allow complacency to become our greatest threat.

When we see autocratic regimes seek to silence dissidents and perceived enemies, we are shocked – but we should not be surprised.

When hackers exploit known vulnerabilities to compromise networks, we are shocked – but we should certainly not be surprised.

When antisemitism grows after being tolerated and normalised, we are shocked – but we should not be surprised.

When inflammatory rhetoric and provocative protest lead to violence, we are shocked – but we should not be surprised.

When a radicalised individual or small group uses an easily obtained weapon to conduct a terrorist attack when the threat level is PROBABLE, we are shocked – but we should not be surprised.

When Australian critical infrastructure is disrupted, we will be shocked – but we should not be surprised.

And when an Australian is killed at the hands of a Foreign Government on Australian soil, we will be shocked – but we should not be surprised.

We shouldn’t tolerate these threats or accept them as normal. To the contrary, we must all recognise them and we must all confront them.

If you face an immediate threat, call the police. If you see something that concerns you, call the National Security Hotline on 1800 123 400. One call can make a difference.

And by addressing known vulnerabilities and responsibly managing known risks, we can all help make Australia a harder and more resilient target.

That’s why ASIO is aggressively adopting new tools and techniques – including artificial intelligence – to navigate our security environment.

And that’s why if you are interested in joining ASIO’s mission, then ASIO is interested in you. Sorry for the shameless plug. We are currently recruiting across the enterprise – the intelligence development programme, finance graduates, human resources graduates, technologists, executive assistants… a diversity of roles are available.

All ASIO’s teams contribute to our mission and every ASIO officer makes a difference, whether you collect the dots or connect the dots, run cables or run sources, code networks or penetrate networks.

I mentioned earlier we’ve successfully resolved scores of significant-terror related cases since 2014 – including fourteen since Bondi.

Security is a shared responsibility and many of the dynamics shaping our security environment are not things ASIO can address alone.

The tolerance of intolerance, the growth of grievance, the radicalisation of minors, the embrace of conspiracy… all these things require a whole of community response.

People applying for a visa to come to this country are required to read and acknowledge a list of the things Australia values. One of the principles listed is a ‘fair go’ for all, encompassing mutual respect and tolerance.

I reckon a ‘fair go’ for all could be a good place to start. I appreciate this is not traditional territory for a spy chief, but I firmly believe if more Australians – not just visitors – embraced the ethos of a fair go, mutual respect and tolerance, the temperature of our security environment would be several degrees lower.

By all means disagree, but consider how we disagree.

By all means protest, but consider how we protest.

By all means report the news, but consider how you report the news.

By all means condemn a government or a political party, but consider whether you should condemn a people.

Despite the scale of this challenge, Australia is well placed to meet it.

Our Parliaments are sovereign, our communities are resilient, our economy is growing and while we may not be perfect, our security and law enforcement agencies are world class.

We should not be insecure about our security: we can and should have confidence in our ability to respond.

But in a dynamic, diverse and degraded security environment – that confidence is being tested.

Thank you.

Conclusion

I previously wrote about the challenges the Australian government faces in managing anti-semitism, unruly protestors, and religious preachers who use and abuse religion in the name of politics in my article titled “Will the radicalisation of protesters lead to more terrorist attacks in Australia?”. I encourage security practitioners and law enforcement in Australia to read it here.

To protect Australians and Australia’s interests, I wish to share with the Australian leaders that they should rise to the challenge before it is too late!

I congratulate Prime Minister Anthony Albanese for his decisive actions on shutting down Iranian operations after the criminal networks engaged in the illicit tobacco trade on Australian soil were exploited by Iran’s IRGC to firebomb the Melbourne synagogue (Adas Israel, 2024) and a Sydney cafe (Lewis Continental Kitchen, 2025).

I wish to thank many Australian leaders that enabled me to conduct a year-long study on the crime-terror nexus in Australia; and produce the Paper titled “The Australian Illicit Cigarette Trade: The Role of Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Societal Harm” published by Crime Stoppers International is a must-read resource for Australia’s security sector. 

Immediately after 88 Australians were killed in the Bali bombing by Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists in Oct 2002, the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research that I founded, partnered with the Australian authorities to help build ASEAN’s counter terrorism capacity. Australian leaders built an impressive offshore counterterrorism capacity starting in Indonesia with Australian Federal Police Commander Graham Ashton’s deployment in Bali & Commander Lester Cross establishing the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation. Our chief trainer Adam Dolnik conducted counter terrorism training programs in the region; conducted training for state law enforcement in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and Hobart; and, with Australian brains we built a counter terrorism database for the region and beyond.

I studied the Australian threat landscape over two decades. Having met with 4 Australian Prime Ministers – John Howard, Kevin Rudd, Tony Abbot, & Malcolm Turnbull as well as their officials who took decisive action against threats. I recall the meetings with Dennis Richardson and David Irvine who disrupted the terrorist-criminal support and operational infrastructure.

The crime-terror nexus is a national security risk! The Australian response should be far reaching and robust to dismantle both the terrorist and the criminal infrastructure! As the Asian and the Middle Eastern nexus is evident, Australian national security and law enforcement officers should lead the way by constituting a task force with their regional and international partners! 

(This is an independent article written by a third party author. The views and opinions expressed in this article do not neccasarily reflect those of the publisher)